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ITERATED REFLECTION OVER FULL DISQUOTATIONAL
TRUTH
MARTIN FISCHER & CARLO NICOLAI & LEON HORSTEN
Abstract. Iterated reflection principles have been employed extensively to
unfold epistemic commitments that are incurred by accepting a mathematical
theory. Recently this has been applied to theories of truth. The idea is to
start with a collection of Tarski-biconditionals and arrive by finitely iterated
reflection at strong compositional truth theories. In the context of classical
logic it is incoherent to adopt an initial truth theory in which A and ‘A is true’
are inter-derivable. In this article we show how in the context of a weaker
logic, which we call Basic De Morgan Logic, we can coherently start with such
a fully disquotational truth theory and arrive at a strong compositional truth
theory by applying a natural uniform reflection principle a finite number of
times.
1. Introduction
In the paper we pursue the strategy of iterating reflection principles on a ba-
sic truth theory TS0 that encapsulates, or so we argue, the fundamental building
blocks of truth-theoretic reasoning. Its components are: a theory of the objects
of truth (syntax theory in our case), basic truth-theoretic principles that enable
us to infer Tpφq from a sentence φ and vice-versa. In order to remain faithful to
these assertability conditions for truth ascriptions, classical logic cannot be used
on account of the liar paradox. In particular, one should be prepared not to have
the rule of conditionalization for all sentences. Also, it is desirable to work at the
right level of generality by, for instance, reasoning without committing oneself to
paracomplete or paraconsistent options. We employ a logic that does this and call
it, following [7], Basic De Morgan logic (cf. §2 for the definition).
The theory TS0, however, may not be all there is to truth. Many authors have
discussed further desiderata for truth – such as full compositionality – that are
out of reach for our basic theory TS0. Recently, Leon Horsten and Graham Leigh
have studied iterations of reflection over a basic theory in classical logic [14]. Their
classical starting point, however, leads to a loss of the intimate connection between
truths and their assertability that is present in TS0. In the following we therefore
extend Horsten and Leigh’s strategy in the framework of Basic De Morgan logic.
Reflection is rooted in the fundamental intuition that we are committed to the
truth of the sentences that are provable in a theory that we accept. This operation
can be expressed in different ways: as global reflection, where we make explicit use
of the truth predicate, or as uniform reflection, where we express this intuition
schematically without direct reference to truth. In the classical case, global and
uniform reflection are provably different operations: a variety of well-known theories
of truth can be closed under uniform reflection but not under global reflection.
However, this is not so in the case of Basic De Morgan logics and variations thereof,
1
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where global and uniform reflection coincide for a wide class of theories containing
the truth principles of TS0.
The theories that we study in this work, resulting from the iteration of reflec-
tion over TS0, can be characterized as internal axiomatizations of Kripke’s fixed
point construction because their principles and rules are all sound with respect
to this class of models. The paradigmatic case of an internal theory is PKF [11].
These theories are faithful to the fixed-point models and interact well with the
process of reflection. There is an alternative array of theories capturing Kripke’s
construction externally. They are couched in classical logic and they are meant
to be faithful to the set-theoretic definition of this class of models. Among the
external theories we find the well-known classical axiomatization KF of Kripke’s
construction [6], and also the iteration of reflection studied by Horsten and Leigh.
Although external axiomatizations invoke principles that are not valid in the in-
tended semantics and they usually cannot be closed under global reflection, they
are usually proof-theoretically stronger than the corresponding internal axiomati-
zations. As a consequence, they also deem true more sentences that belong to the
intended extension of the truth predicate than the corresponding internal axioma-
tizations; for some authors (cf. [10, 12]), this is considered a clear advantage over
internal theories.
For instance, KF is proof-theoretically much stronger than its natural internal
counterpart PKF. The former proves transfinite induction for all sentences of the
language with the truth predicate up to any ordinal smaller than ε0, the latter only
up to any ordinal smaller than ωω. The main result of the present article is that two
steps of reflection over TS0 enbles us to recapture all principles of PKF and prove
significantly more transfinite induction than what is available in PKF. Moreover,
iterated reflection on TS0 enables us to reach the strength of KF.
2. The core laws of truth
In this section we introduce the main components of the theory TS0. We first
introduce a two-sided sequent version of Basic De Morgan logic and state some
simple properties of this calculus. We then introduce the principles governing the
objects to which truth is ascribed, which will amount to the axioms of a very weak
arithmetical theory. Finally we state the truth theoretic principles of TS0.
2.1. Basic De Morgan Logic. We employ a two-sided sequent calculus BDM
reminiscent of the one employed in [10]; sequents are expressions of the form Γ⇒ ∆
where Γ,∆ are finite sets of formulas. We write ¬Γ for {¬A | A ∈ Γ}. BDM is a
subsystem of a suitable two-sided classical calculus; its axioms and rules are listed
in Table 1. Intuitively, BDM is obtained from classical logic by replacing the usual
clauses for negation with (CP1) and (CP2) below. However, the general negation
rules (CP1-2) enable us to derive the sequents A ⇒ ¬¬A and ¬¬A ⇒ A for all
formulas A and make the following contraposition rule admissible in BDM:
Γ⇒ ∆ (Cont)
¬∆⇒ ¬Γ
.
The following closely related lemma will be extensively used in what follows:
Lemma 1. For a signature S = {P1, . . . , Pn}, if for all atomic formulas A of S
we can prove ⇒ A,¬A, then BDM(S) is closed under the following classical rules
for negation:
ITERATED REFLECTION OVER FULL DISQUOTATIONAL TRUTH 3
Γ⇒ ∆, A
(¬L)
¬A,Γ⇒ ∆
A,Γ⇒ ∆
(¬R)
Γ⇒ ∆,¬A
BDM enjoys standard properties of Gentzen-type sequent calculi such as substitu-
tion, inversion, and cut elimination.
A natural semantics for BDM is given in terms of four-valued models, that is we
also allow predicates with a partial or a paraconsistent behaviour (gaps and gluts).1
The intended satisfaction relation has a double clause: a sequent is satisfied in a
model M just in case if all formulas in the antecedent are true in M there is a
formula in the consequent true in M, and if all formulas in the succedent are false
inM, there is a false-in-M formula in the antecedent. BDM is sound and complete
with respect to the semantics just hinted at [2].
A ⇒ A for A ∈ LT
Γ ⇒ ∆ (LW)
A,Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆ (RW)
Γ ⇒ ∆, A
Γ ⇒ ∆, A A,Γ ⇒ ∆
(Cut)
Γ ⇒ ∆
¬Γ ⇒ ∆ (CP1)
¬∆ ⇒ Γ
Γ ⇒ ¬∆ (CP2)
∆ ⇒ ¬Γ
A,B,Γ ⇒ ∆
(L∧)
A ∧B,Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆, A Γ ⇒ ∆, B
(R∧)
Γ ⇒ ∆, A ∧ B
A,Γ ⇒ ∆ B,Γ ⇒ ∆
(L∨)
A ∨B,Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆, A,B
(R∨)
Γ ⇒ ∆, A ∨ B
Γ, A(t) ⇒ ∆
(L∀)
Γ, ∀xA ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆, A(t)
(R∃)
Γ ⇒ ∆,∃xA
Γ ⇒ ∆, A(x)
(R∀)
Γ ⇒ ∆,∀xA
Γ, A(x) ⇒ ∆
(L∃)
Γ,∃xA ⇒ ∆
x not free in Γ,∆ x not free in Γ,∆
Table 1. The system BDM
2.2. The theory TS0. To formulate TS0, we first consider identity, which is gov-
erned by usual principles:
⇒ t = t(Id1)
s = t, A(s)⇒ A(t)(Id2)
1Our logic is close to what is sometimes called FDE. We follow, however, Field’s terminology.
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TS0 and all its extensions will be formulated in the language of arithmetic L,
expanded with finitely many function symbols corresponding to suitable elementary
operations and the truth predicate T. We call the resulting language LT. TS0
will also contain initial sequents ⇒ A for all basic axioms A of a suitable system
of arithmetic, in our case Kalmar’s elementary arithmetic EA formulated in LT
(cf. [1, 9]). In addition, our basic theory features an induction rule
(∆0-IND)
Γ, A(x)⇒ A(x + 1),∆
Γ, A(0)⇒ A(t),∆
for x not free in A(0),∆,Γ, t is arbitrary, and A is a ∆0-formula of the language L
of arithmetic without the truth predicate. We call the resulting system Basic.
The core principles of truth capture the fundamental idea that one is justified in
asserting a sentence A precisely when she is justified in asserting that A is true.
Definition 1 (The system TS0). TS0 is obtained by extending Basic with the initial
sequents
T(pAq)⇒ A(T1)
A⇒ T(pAq)(T2)
for all LT-sentences A.
TS0 stands for ‘truth sequents’. The subscript 0 indicates a restriction of induction
to ∆0 formulas; its absence indicates full induction. The semantic conservativeness
– and therefore the consistency – of TS0 over Basic can be obtained by expanding
any model of the latter with an interpretation of the truth predicate resulting from
a positive inductive definition along the lines of the Kripke construction (cf. [3, §5]).
The following observation can be found in [11, Lem. 16].
Lemma 2. ⇒ A,¬A is derivable in TS0 given that A is arithmetical.
The principles of TS0 are therefore just right to capture the desired assertability
conditions for truth ascriptions: its basic truth-theoretic principles (T1)-(T2) are
in fact not as strong as the classical Tarski-biconditionals: otherwise they would
lead to inconsistency. But they are also stronger than mere inference rules, as the
latter do not allow for conditionalization for arithmetical sentences.
In addition, we can think of TS0 as a minimal internal axiomatization of a fixed-
point construction along the lines of Kripke’s [16]. The fixed-points we are inter-
ested in are in fact fixed-points of a monotone operator Γ associated with the Basic
De Morgan evaluation scheme.2 The crucial property of Kripke style fixed points
S, i.e. sets of sentences S such that Γ(S) = S, is that every sentence A is in S iff
T(pAq) is in S. By combining this fact with the notion of satisfaction introduced
on p.3 we can easily see that for a fixed point S, the model (N, S) satisfies TS0
when S is taken to be the extension of the truth predicate. Moreover, for (N, S) to
satisfy TS0, S has to contain the same sentences as Γ(S). This means that S is a
fixed-point of Γ iff (N, S) satisfies TS0, and therefore it is an internal axiomatization
of the fixed-point construction in the sense of §1. Moreover any LT-theory in BDM
satisfying the adequacy condition just considered will contain the principles of TS0.
2For a definition of the operator and the evaluation scheme we refer the reader to Halbach [10,
section 15.1].
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2.3. The weakness of TS0 and the advantages of reflection in BDM. In
the previous subsection we have introduced TS0 as a natural and simple theory
capturing distinctive features of the notion of truth. However, the theory in itself
falls short of several adequacy requirements generally imposed to theories of truth–
see for instance [17] and [13]. For instance one important requirement for truth is
compositionality, which explains how we can understand complex sentences only
on the basis of an understanding of its compounds and its logical structure. TS0 is
clearly not compositional as can be realized by considering the quantifiers. For a
universally quantified sentence, such as ∀xA(x), the theory TS0 is not able to derive
in general sequents explaining how the truth value depends on the truth values of
its compounds A(t) in the sense that ∀xT([Ax])⇒ T(p∀xA(x)q).
Another criterion of adequacy for theories of truth that we want to impose is the
ability to prove important generalizations; one especially desirable generalization
to follow from a theory of truth is the soundness of the base theory stated in the
form of the global reflection principle for Basic, i.e.
(GRFBasic) BewBasic(x)⇒ T(x),
which is not derivable in TS0 (where BewT (x) is a canonical provability predicate
for T ). The underivability of the global reflection principle directly follows from
the fact that TS0 is a conservative extension of Basic.
It is difficult to give an exact criterion of what it means for a truth theory to
prove all the important generalizations that it should prove. But it is obvious that
a stronger theory of truth is, all other things being equal, better than a weaker one.
It is therefore natural to aim for a theory of truth that is, relative to a base theory,
as strong as possible. Taken as a measure of the proof-theoretic strength of TS0,
the conservativeness of TS0 over Basic only considers arithmetical sentences, but
we want our measure also to take into account generalizations involving the truth
predicate. Therefore we will mainly focus on the amount of transfinite induction
for the language LT we can prove.
Following a strategy already proposed and defended in [14] for theories formu-
lated in classical logic, one may think of TS0 as implicitly containing stronger prin-
ciples, including compositional ones and principles of transfinite induction. This
relation of implicit containment can be unfolded via postulating a hierarchy of re-
flection principles over TS0. Traditionally, reflection principles for a theory T are
explicit soundness assertions (“whatever is provable in T , is true”). The soundness
of T is naturally expressed via GRFT .
3 However, by Tarski’s undefinability theo-
rem, GRFT can only be formulated if the expressive resources of T are increased
with a fresh truth predicate. Therefore, if one wants to express soundness in an
arithmetical language, one must resort to schemata. A well-known candidate is
what is widely known as the uniform reflection principle for T :
(RFNT ) ∀x(BewT ([A(x)])→ A(x))
where [Ax] := sub(pAxq, pxq, num(x)), where num represents the elementary func-
tion sending a number n to the n-th numeral and sub the usual substitution func-
tion, whereas x(y/v) will stand for sub(x, v, num(y)) with v coding a variable free
in x. RFNT states that, for every number x, if A is satisfied by the numeral for x,
3This reading of reflection is ubiquitous in the literature. See for instance the classical hand-
book entry [21] and [10]. Kreisel and Le´vy in [15] clearly states that global reflection is the
intended soundness claim for a theory T .
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provably in T , then A is satisfied by x. However, we are mainly concerned with
languages that do contain a truth predicate. In this context, therefore, the most
natural way to express the soundness of a theory is by means of global reflection.
In fact, if the truth predicate satisfies minimal conditions, the global reflection
principles implies all instances of uniform reflection for a theory T .
There is therefore an intuitive connection between uniform and global reflection:
both are intended to express the soundness of the base theory. It turns out, however,
that this connection is lost in the classical axiomatizations of Kripke’s fixed point
construction considered by Leigh and Horsten in [14]. For T an axiomatization
of Kripke’s fixed point construction in classical logic, in fact, the result of adding
GRFT to it determines a severe restriction of the class of acceptable models: all
consistent fixed points are excluded, i.e., if (N, S) models T +GRFT with S a fixed
point, then S is inconsistent.4 By contrast, T +RFNT can have models of the form
(N, S) for S a consistent fixed point (in fact all consistent fixed points).
There is a natural explanation for the internal inconsistency of T + GRFT : clas-
sical theories T of the sort just mentioned are in fact unsound with respect to the
notion of truth captured by T , and GRFT makes this explicit. In fact, many theo-
rems involving the truth predicate in a classical axiomatization T of the fixed-point
construction are outside the extension of the truth predicate given by consistent
fixed points. The classical tautology λ∨¬λ involving a liar sentence is one such ex-
ample. Uniform reflection alone, in theories such as T , does not suffice to uncover
their unsoundness:5 this is the sense in which the intimate connection between
global and uniform reflection is lost in the classical setting.
The close connections between the two forms of reflection just considered, how-
ever, can be restored by moving to internal axiomatizations of Kripke fixed points
such as extensions of TS0. To see this, we first reformulate both principles in rule
form and adapt them to the sequent-style formulation of TS0 we have chosen.
⇒ BewT ([Ax])
(RFNRT )⇒ A(x)
⇒ SentLT(x) ∧ BewT (x)
(GRFRT )⇒ Tx
In (RFNRT ), A(x) is a formula of LT with one free variable, in GRF
R
T the elementary
predicate SentLT(x) expresses the set of LT-sentences, and in both rules BewT (A)
states that the sequent⇒ (A) is derivable in T . Finally, we introduce an extension
of TS0 obtained by replacing the axioms (T1) and (T2) with
(i) A(x)⇒ T[Ax];
(ii) T[Ax]⇒ A(x).
We call the resulting system UTS0 (“uniform TS0). We can now establish that not
only uniform and global reflection are connected in Basic De Morgan logic, but that
they actually coincide.
Proposition 1. Let T contain UTS0. Then T +RFN
R
T and T +GRF
R
T are identical
theories.
4 By the diagonal lemma, the arithmetical part of T already proves (λ∧¬Tpλq)∨ (¬λ∧Tpλq)
for λ a liar sentence. Therefore T + GRFT proves T
(
p(λ ∧ ¬Tpλq) ∨ (¬λ∧ Tpλq)q). Since T is an
axiomatization of the class of Kripke fixed points, we can use compositional and truth-iteration
principles to obtain, still in T + GRFT , T(pλ∧¬λq). A well-known example of such a theory T is
a the theory KF from [6] – see also [10].
5This is also the reason why Horsten and Leigh could consider iterations of uniform reflection
without restrictions on the fixed-points models.
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Proof. We start by showing that global reflection entails uniform reflection. Rea-
soning in T + GRFRT , we assume that the sequent ⇒ BewT ([Ax]) is derivable in it.
Then, by GRFRT , we have T[Ax] and therefore Ax by (ii) above.
For the other direction, we reason in T + RFNRT and assume that the sequent
⇒ SentLT(x) ∧ BewT (x) is derivable in it. Also, we know that (i) and (ii) are
derivable sequents of UTS0 – and then also of T –, and therefore there will be a
canonical provability predicate for sequents PrT (x, y) for T such that⇒ PrT (x, [Tx])
is a derivable sequent of T . By combining this latter fact with our assumption, we
obtain⇒ BewT ([Tx]). By RFN
R
T , therefore, we can conclude⇒ Tx, as desired. 
Proposition 1 suggests that Leigh and Horsten’s project can be more coherently
carried in the context of nonclassical theories of truth. In the next section we will
in fact employ strengthenings of the reflection principles considered in Proposition
1 to unfold the truth-theoretic and mathematical content implicit in the acceptance
of TS0.
3. Reflecting on TS0
This section introduces the main results of the paper: in §3.1 we discuss several
alternative reflection rules and motivate the choice of a particular form of reflection
on admissible rules that turns out to be stronger than simple reflection on derivable
sequents. In §3.2 we show that the closure under two applications of our rule of
reflection suffices to recover the strong internal axiomatization of Kripke’s fixed
point PKF. Finally, in §3.3 we show that the result of reflecting twice on TS0
proves more transfinite induction for the language with the truth predicate than
PKF itself. We conclude the section by investigating further iterations of reflection.
3.1. Reflection on sequents and rules. In what follows, we assume a canonical
Go¨del numbering for LT-expressions. For a fixed expression e of LT, we will use
the usual Go¨del corners for the closed term of LT representing Go¨del number #e of
e. Therefore, for formulas A of LT, we will have pAq = #A. Similarly, for sequents
Γ ⇒ ∆, pΓ ⇒ ∆q = #Γ⇒ ∆, where the Go¨del code of Γ ⇒ ∆ is taken to be an
ordered pair whose components are the codes of the finite sets Γ and ∆.6 Closed
terms standing for specific Go¨del codes of LT-expressions contrast with open terms
standing for templates to generate such closed terms: a well-known example of such
a template is the open LT-term sub(pA(v)q, pvq, num(x)), standing for the result of
formally substituting, in the formulaA(v), the free variable v with the numeral for x.
To distinguish these open terms from specific codes, we use square brackets instead
of Go¨del codes, so that, for instance, [A(x)] stands for sub(pA(v)q, pvq, num(x)).7
This distinction clearly generalizes to sequents and formulas with more than one
free variable: [Γ~x ⇒ ∆~x] refers to the simultaneous substitution in pΓ ⇒ ∆q of
the variables in the strings ~x with their corresponding numerals, where of course
[Γx ⇒ ∆x] is short for sub((pΓq, p∆q), pxq, num(x)). When it is clear from the
context which free variable we are formally substituting, we will omit it and treat
sub as a binary function.
6We assume that the code of the finite set Γ is the code of the sequence of codes of formulas
in Γ in ascending order.
7The square brackets notation is often replaced by the so-called Feferman dot notation, in
which, for instance, sub(pA(v)q, pvq, num(x)) is abbreviated with pA(x˙)q.
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As we have seen, in the classical setting the uniform reflection schema and rule
take the form:
PrT ([A(x)])⇒ A(x)(RFN
R
T )
⇒ PrT ([A(x)])
⇒ A(x)
(URFNRT )
Over EA, URFNRT and RFN
R
T are equivalent, as shown by Feferman in [4]. In the
non-trivial direction, i.e. going from the rule to the initial sequent, one shows that
Basic suffices to formalize the fact that the sentence PrfT (n¯, pA(m¯)q) → A(m¯) is
provable in T for any m,n ∈ ω. Therefore one application of (URFNRT ) yields
(RFNRT ).
In the nonclassical setting the situation is different. Whereas in the classical
setting we can formulate (URFNRT ) and (RFN
R
T ) in a one-sided sequent calculus,
there are good reasons to stick with a two-sided calculus for Basic De Morgan logic.
In a one-sided classical system, in fact, sequents A,¬A play the role that initial
sequents A ⇒ A play in a two-sided setting. In our system this correspondence
breaks down: first of all, A,¬A is not generally valid in our intended semantics –
if A is a liar sentence, for instance –, whereas A ⇒ A are initial sequents of our
system. Moreover, there is no conditional naturally corresponding to the sequent
arrow since ⇒ A→ A is just a notational variant of ⇒ A ∨ ¬A.
We therefore opt for a formulation of our first reflection principle as applying
to provable (two-sided) sequents. As a consequence, basic syntactic considerations
force us to formulate reflection in rule-form. The uniform reflection principle for
sequents of T takes the following form:
(rT )
⇒ PrT ([ Γ~x⇒ ∆~y ])
Γ⇒ ∆
But the simple rule of reflection (rT ) is not the only form of reflection that will be
relevant for what follows. A suitable conditional – such as the classical or the intu-
itionistic conditional – enables one to compress in one sequent chains of reasoning
featuring embedded implications. In our setting, the highly meta-theoretic nature
of the sequent arrow forces us to capture these chains of reasoning explicitly via
suitable extensions of the simple reflection rule (rT ). One way to achieve this is to
focus not only on provable sequents, but also to take into account rules admissible
in T .
In order to introduce these generalized forms of reflection we consider a variation
of the reflection rule based on a two place provability predicate Pr2T (x, y) understood
as ‘the inference from the sequent x to the sequent y is provably admissible in T ’.
In addition to being admissible, a provably admissible rule in a theory T requires
the existence of a T -provable proof transformation of the proof of the premise into
a proof of the conclusion of the rule.8
8For instance, although the rule of cut applied to ‘geometric’ formulations of Robinson’s arith-
metic Q is admissible in it, cut is not provably admissible in Q as this procedure is of hyperex-
ponential growth rate. (For a geometric presentation of Robinson’s arithmetic and for the cut
elimination for it, see [18].)
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Pr
2
T enjoys generalized versions of some of the properties usually ascribed to
provability predicates:
If
Γ(x)⇒ ∆(x)
Θ(x)⇒ Λ(x)
is admissible in T , provably in Basic, then(Pr1)
Basic ⊢ Pr2T ([Γ(x)⇒ ∆(x)], [Θ(x)⇒ Λ(x)])
If the sequents(Pr2)
Pr
2
T ([Γ(x)⇒ ∆(x)], [Θ(x)⇒ Λ(x)]);
and
PrT ([Γ(x)⇒ ∆(x)])
are derivable in Basic, then also
PrT ([Θ(x)⇒ Λ(x)])
is derivable in Basic.
We can then define the uniform reflection principle for provably admissible rules in
T :
Pr
2
T ([Γ(x)⇒ ∆(x)], [Θ(x)⇒ Λ(x)]) Γ(x)⇒ ∆(x)
Θ(x)⇒ Λ(x)
(RT )
Obviously, in the context of any reasonable theory T , RT implies rT . If T is an
axiomatizable theory, then the reflection on T is the closure of Basic under the
reflection rules r(T ) and R(T ):
r(T ) := Basic+ (rT )
R(T ) := Basic+ (RT )
Theories obtained by iterating our reflection rules are then defined in a standard
manner: for instance, R(R(T )) is the result of closing R(T ) under RR(T ). We ab-
breviate R(R(T )) as R2(T ), and similarly for more iterations.
We have introduced (RT ) as a generalization of (rT ). A natural question is
whether (RT ) is actually stronger than the simpler rule. We will not answer to
this question in this paper but we will prove some facts that may be relevant for
a future answer. For instance, we now provide an upper bound for the strength
of r(UTS0); later – cf. Proposition 3 – we will show that the resulting theory is a
proper subtheory of R2(TS0).
The upper bound for r(UTS0) that we now provide is given in terms of the theory
PKF that was mentioned in the introduction. PKF is also formulated in the language
LT, and its axioms and rules are displayed in Table 2.
In T=1−2, the function symbol =. represents the elementary syntactic operation
of forming an identity statement out of two terms. A similar notation will be
applied for other syntactic operations. As mentioned earlier, PKF is an internal
axiomatization of Kripke’s theory of truth. Crucially, PKF is fully compositional
as also negation commutes with the truth predicate. Halbach and Horsten in [11]
have measured the proof-theoretic strength of PKF by showing that PKF proves
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logic logical initial sequents and rules of BDM
identity Id1, Id2
arithmetic ⇒ A for A a basic axiom of EA
plus the full induction rule for LT:
Γ, A(x)⇒ A(x+ 1¯),∆
(IND)
Γ, A(0)⇒ A(t),∆
atomic truth (T =1) ct(x), ct(y), val(x) = val(y)⇒ T(x=. y)
(T =2) ct(x), ct(y),T(x=. y)⇒ val(x) = val(y)
(TT1) T[Tx]⇒ Tx
(TT2) Tx⇒ T[Tx]
truth principles (T∧1) SentLT(x∧. y),T(x) ∧ T(y)⇒ T(x∧. y)
for connectives (T∧2) SentLT(x∧. y),T(x∧. y)⇒ T(x) ∧ T(y)
(T∨1) SentLT(x∨. y),T(x) ∨ T(y)⇒ T(x∧. y)
(T∨2) SentLT(x∨. y),T(x∨. y)⇒ T(x) ∨ T(y)
(T¬1) SentLT(x),T(¬. x)⇒ ¬T(x)
(T¬1) SentLT(x),¬T(x)⇒ T(¬. x)
truth principles (T∀1) SentLT(∀.yx), ∀yTx(y/v)⇒ T(∀.yx)
for quantifiers (T∀2) SentLT(∀.yx),T(∀.yx)⇒ ∀yTx(y/v)
(T∃1) SentLT(∃.yx), ∃yTx(y/v)⇒ T(∃.yx)
(T∃2) SentLT(∃.yx),T(∃.yx)⇒ ∃yTx(y/v)
Table 2. The theory PKF
arithmetical transfinite induction up to the ordinal ϕω0. Therefore we can use PKF
as means of comparison for our theories of iterated reflection.
Proposition 2. r(UTS0) is a subtheory of PKF.
Proof. To prove Proposition 2 we only need to check that PKF can handle reflection.
Therefore we first establish that PKF is strong enough to prove the soundness of
UTS0. To this end, for ordinal codes α, we define a hierarchy of predicates Trα(·)
as T(·) ∧ SentL<α
T
(·).9 Halbach and Horsten establish in [11] that PKF proves the
predicates Trβ to behave like Tarskian truth predicates for β < ω
ω: that is for
formulas of LT that are in L
<ω
T
, the classical commutation conditions for typed
truth predicates hold, while for LT-formulas A not in L
ω
T, we can prove ¬TωpAq.
9The truth predicates Trα can be defined for as many ordinals as we can code in our theory.
In §3.3, in particular, we will employ a coding for ordinals smaller than Γ0.
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We can extend this definition to sequents via the predicate TRα(·) in the following
way:
TRα(pΓ⇒ ∆q) :↔
(
(Trα(p
∧
Γq)→ Trα(p
∨
∆q)) ∧
(Trα(p¬
∨
∆q)→ Trα(p¬
∧
Γq)
)
From the proof-theoretic analysis of PKF in [11] we know that the truth predicates
up to ωω behave classically in it, and that we can employ the material conditional
to carry out the inductive proof of the following:
(1) PKF ⊢⇒ PrUTS0([Γx⇒ ∆x])→ TRω([Γx⇒ ∆x])
The proof employs the induction rule of PKF. It suffices, therefore, to establish
⇒ PrfUTS0(0, [Γx⇒ ∆x])→ TRω([Γx⇒ ∆x])(2)
PrfUTS0(u, [Γx⇒ ∆x])→ TRω([Γx⇒ ∆x])⇒(3)
PrfUTS0(u+ 1, [Γx⇒ ∆x])→ TRω[Γx⇒ ∆x])
where PrfT (x, y) expresses that y is provable in T with a proof of length less or
equal to x.
We consider the crucial case of the characterizing principles of UTS0, (i)-(ii) on
page 6. Reasoning classically in PKF, we assume
(4) PrfUTS0(0, [T[Ax]⇒ Ax])
We need to show
Tω[T[Ax]]→ Tω[Ax](5)
Tω[¬Ax]→ Tω[¬T[Ax]](6)
We start with (5). If Tω[T[Ax]], then for some n ∈ ω and m < n, Tn[Tm[Ax]].
Therefore, since Tn and Tm are Tarskian truth predicates, also Tn[Ax].
Similarly for (6), if Tω[¬Ax], then Tn[¬Ax] for some n ∈ ω, and, since Tn[Ax]
is in Ln+1
T
, also Tn+1¬[Tn[Ax]] and therefore Tω[¬T[Ax]]. 
3.2. Recovering compositionality by reflection. One of the goals of this sec-
tion is to show that by reflecting on our core laws of truth we can recover desirable
compositional principles. More specifically, reflecting on TS0 is sufficient to recover
the initial sequents and the full induction rule of PKF.
In a first step we show that adding the reflection principle for TS0 to Basic allows
us to derive the initial sequents of UTS0.
Lemma 3. UTS0 ⊆ r(TS0).
Proof. For all n ∈ ω we have TS0 ⊢ T(pA(n)q)⇒ A(n). Therefore, Basic proves:
(7) ∀y(SentLT(y)→ AxTS0(sub(pTxq, num(y)), y))
and
(8) ∀x (SentL([Bx]),
where, we recall, [Bx] := sub(pBvq, num(x)) for all LT-formulas B with one free
variable. Therefore, by combining (7) and (8), we also have in Basic
(9) AxTS0(sub(pTxq, num([Ax]), [Ax]))
Therefore, by definition of the canonical provability predicate PrTS0 ,
(10) PrTS0(sub(pTxq, num([Ax])), [Ax])
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Let tr(x) the elementary function that formally prefixes pTq to the numeral for x.
Then Basic also proves the equation:
sub(pTxq, num([Ax])) = sub(tr([Av]), num(x))(11)
By performing the appropriate substitution in (10), we have
(12) PrTS0(sub(tr([Av]), num(x)), [Ax])
and therefore, by the properties of substitution, also
(13) PrTS0(sub(tr([Av]), pAvq), num(x)).
The other direction is analogous.
In r(TS0) – and a fortiori in R(TS0) – therefore, we obtain
T[Ax]⇒ A(x)
A(x)⇒ T[Ax]
as desired. 
As a consequence of the previous lemma, in r(TS0) we can already prove the full
truth sequents for atomic arithmetical formulas and for truth ascriptions containing
free variables (T =1), (T =2), (TT1), and (TT2). That (TT1) and (TT2) are direct
instances of the initial truth sequents of UTS0 is immediate. For the identity
initial sequents, a slightly more general version of the Tarski sequents would be
required, namely one in which at least two free variables appear. However, since
we are working over Basic, we can always assume that the free variable in the truth
sequents of UTS0 stands for (the code of) a string of free variables of finite length.
However, also the other initial, compositional sequents of PKF for the propositional
connectives ∧,∨,¬ can be proved in r(TS0):
Lemma 4. In r(TS0) we can derive (T∧1-2), (T∨1-2), (T¬1-2).
Proof. In TS0 we can directly prove the schematic form of the compositional clauses,
for example TS0 ⊢ T(pAq) ∧ T(pBq)⇒ (TpA ∧ Bq) for all LT-sentences A,B. By
formalizing this fact in Basic, we obtain
(14) PrTS0([SentLT(x∧. y),Tx ∧ Ty ⇒ T(x∧. y)]).
In r(UTS0), therefore, we can then move from the formalization to the full quan-
tifiable statement
(15) SentLT(x∧. y),Tx ∧ Ty ⇒ T(x∧. y)
as desired. The case for the other connectives are analogous. 
However, by looking at Table 2 one realizes that compositional initial sequents
for the propositional connectives by themselves are not enough to capture all truth
principles of PKF: we also need initial sequents for quantifiers and full induction
for LT (IND). We will first show how to recover full induction.
It is a well known result that, in arithmetical context, (uniformly) reflecting on
EA suffices to obtain the full induction schema for L. Kreisel and Le´vy, in [15],
proved the equivalence of uniform reflection and full induction over EA – that is the
equivalence of EA plus uniform reflection for EA and Peano Arithmetic (PA).10 We
will apply Kreisel and Levy’s strategy to our setting. In order to do so, however,
10See Beklemishev [1], p. 37 for a proof of this fact.
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their original argument has to be modified in several respects. First of all, we allow
formulas of LT and not just of L to appear in instances of the induction schema.
In addition, we have to consider an induction rule because the induction axiom
involving the material conditional may fail to be sound in the setting of Basic De
Morgan Logic. Finally, already in this step, we shall employ of our generalized
reflection rule RT instead of the basic reflection rule rT . In what follows we denote
as PAT the version of PA formulated in LT whose logic is BDM and in which the
truth predicate can appear in instances of induction.
Lemma 5. PAT ⊆ R(Basic)
Proof. Let A(x) be a formula in LT with one free variable. We want to show that
in R(Basic) the full induction rule
(16)
Γ, A(x)⇒ A(x+ 1¯),∆
Γ, A(0)⇒ A(t),∆
for formulas of LT is admissible. The following inference is admissible in Basic –
and in fact in predicate logic in LT only – for any n ∈ ω:
(17)
Γ, A(x)⇒ A(x+ 1¯),∆
Γ, A(0)⇒ A(n¯),∆
By (Pr1), since the proof transformation in (17) is elementary, Basic proves
(18) Pr2Basic(pΓ, A(x)⇒ A(x+ 1¯),∆q, pΓ, A(0)⇒ A(y˙),∆q)
Now by assumption, (18), and RBasic we conclude
Γ, A(0)⇒ A(y),∆

The full set of compositional sequents of PKF is obtained by complementing the
clauses for the connectives by the ones for quantifiers. This can be achieved by
closing the theory R(TS0) under RR(TS0), that is, by performing one iteration of the
general reflection rule.
Lemma 6. R2(TS0) proves (T∀1−2) and (T∃1−2).
Proof. We prove T∀1; the other cases are treated similarly. For all LT-formulas
A(v) with only v free, R(TS0) proves
T[Ay]⇒ A(y) by Lemma 2.3
∀y T[Ay]⇒ ∀y A(y) by logic
∀y T[Ay]⇒ Tp∀yA(y)q by (T2)
The argument just carried out in R(TS0) can uniformly be formalized in Basic, i.e.,
Basic proves:
PrR(TS0)(pSentLT(∀.yx˙), ∀yTx˙(y/v)⇒ T(∀y x˙(y/v))q)
Therefore R2(TS0) suffices to conclude
SentLT(∀.yx), ∀y Tx(y/v)⇒ T(∀y x(y/v)),
as desired. 
Corollary 1. PKF ⊆ R2(TS0).
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Corollary 1 shows that two iterations of the generalized rule RTS0 over our basic
theory TS0 suffices to recover all compositional truth laws that weren’t immediately
provable in the original theory as well as the full induction rule for the full language
LT. If reflection is considered to be a procedure already implicit in the acceptance
of TS0, then the laws of PKF follow naturally from a few applications of this process.
However, it is natural to ask whether the inclusion established in Cor. 1 is proper.
These questions translate, on the conceptual side, into the task of approximating
the set of sentences that are valid in the intended models of our theories, which are
the Kripke fixed-point models. In doing so, we gather information on how many
truth iterations and general claims involving truth we are permitted to assert upon
accepting TS0 (after reflection) and how many mathematical patterns of reasoning
we regain in the form of transfinite induction.
3.3. Recovering transfinite induction by reflection. In this section we inves-
tigate the question of how much transfinite induction for LT can be recovered in
iterations of the generalized reflection rule over TS0. One of the upshots of our
analysis will be that R2(TS0) properly extends PKF.
To carry out our proofs, we need to assume a notation system (OT,≺) for ordinals
up to the Feferman-Schu¨tte ordinal Γ0 as it can be found, for instance, in [20]. OT
is a primitive recursive set of ordinal codes and ≺ a primitive recursive relation on
OT that is isomorphic to the usual ordering of ordinals up to Γ0. We distinguish
between fixed ordinal codes, which we denote with α, β, γ . . ., and ζ, η, θ . . . as
abbreviations for variables ranging over elements of OT. From the results in [11] it
follows that PKF proves transfinite induction for LT only up to any ordinal smaller
than ωω. If we focus only on L-formulas, however, PKF proves that much higher
ordinals are well-ordered, in particular, PKF proves the same arithmetical sentences
as PA plus transfinite induction for L up to any ordinal smaller than ϕω0.
Before analyzing how much transfinite induction can be proved in R2(TS0), we
introduce some notation. The schema of transfinite induction up to α for the
formula A(v) of a language L1 containing L is the rule
∀ξ ≺ η A(ξ)⇒ A(η)
TIL1(A,α)⇒ ∀ξ ≺ α A(ξ)
We then denote transfinite induction up to some ordinal α with TIL1(< α), standing
for the closure under all rules TIL1(A, β) for A ∈ L1 and β ≺ α. Analogously, we
write TIL1(α) for the closure under all rules TIL1(A,α) for A ∈ L1. In what follows,
we will only deal with the cases in which L1 is either L itself or LT.
As a measure of strength of the theories obtained via iteration of reflection we
will mainly focus on how much transfinite induction for LT is derivable in such
theories. However, there is often a direct connection between the amount of trans-
finite induction for LT and L derivable in a truth theory. Both in the case of KF
and PKF, for instance, the amount of transfinite induction for LT available in the
systems – that is TILT(< ϕ10) and TILT(< ϕ0ω) respectively – can be used to de-
fine classical, Tarskian truth predicates indexed by these ordinals with the crucial
contribution of the compositional truth principles of the two theories. This gives
a lower bound for the systems in terms of ramified truth hierarchies up to ϕ10 (or
ε0) and ϕ0ω (or ω
ω) respectively, which – by a classical result by Feferman – yields
that KF and PKF are proof-theoretically as strong as at least PA+TILT(< ϕε00)
and PA+TILT(< ϕω0) respectively.
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The following proposition shows that iterating the generalized reflection rule
twice over TS0 enables us to go beyond PKF. This also gives us more information
about the question that was posed on page 9 about the comparison between the
rules (rT ) and (RT ). By Proposition 2, the theory r(UTS0) is a subtheory of PKF.
The next will entail that R2(TS0) is indeed stronger than PKF.
Proposition 3. R2(Basic) ⊢ TILT(ω
ω)
Proof. We first prove in R(Basic) that, for all n ∈ ω,
(19)
Γ, ∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η),∆
Γ⇒ ∀ζ ≺ ωn A(ζ),∆
To prove (19), we first prove in R(Basic), for all n ∈ ω:
(20)
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η)
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ η + ωn A(ζ)
We reason as follows in R(Basic):
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η)(21)
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ η + ω0 A(ζ) by (21)(22)
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ η + ωn A(ζ) external ind. hyp.(23)
∀ζ ≺ η + (ωn × x)A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ η + (ωn × x) + ωnA(ζ) from (23)(24)
∀ζ ≺ η + (ωn × 0) A(ζ)⇒ ∀x∀ζ ≺ η + (ωn × x) A(ζ) by (IND)(25)
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ η + ωn+1 A(ζ)(26)
The last two lines give us the induction step and therefore (20) by, possibly, a series
of cuts.
Now in Basic,
(27) Pr2R(Basic)([∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η)], [∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ η + ω
x A(ζ)])
Therefore, in R2(Basic),
(28)
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η)
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ ∀x∀ζ ≺ η + ωx A(ζ)
That is
(29)
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η)
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ η + ωω A(ζ)
But if (29), by letting η to be 0, we get
(30)
Γ, ∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η),∆
Γ⇒ ∀ζ ≺ ωω A(ζ),∆

By the proof theoretic analysis of PKF we know that it can only prove transfinite
induction for LT for ordinals smaller than ω
ω. But this fact is not dependent in
any way on the truth theoretic principles of PKF: already PAT, in fact, proves
TILT(< ω
ω). This is also reflected by the fact that Proposition 3 does not rely on
the truth principles of TS0. However, by Corollary 1, we have:
Corollary 2. PKF is a proper subtheory of R2(TS0).
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Transfinite induction up to ωω, however, is clearly not the limit of what we can
achieve in R2(Basic). By using similar methods to the ones employed in Proposition
3, and starting from (29), we can verify that the following rule is admissible in
R2(Basic):
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η)
∀ζ ≺ θ A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ θ + ωω+k A(ζ)
Generalizing this strategy it is possible to show the following:
Lemma 7. In R(n+1)(Basic) the following rule is admissible:
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η)
∀ζ ≺ θ A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ θ + ωω×nA(ζ)
Proof. By external induction on n. We have established the claim for n = 1.
Assume that it holds for n. Then we can argue in R(n+1)(Basic): Assume
∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η)
then by the induction hypothesis we have
∀ζ ≺ θ A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ θ + ωω×nA(ζ)
and
∀ζ ≺ θ + ωω×n × k A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ θ + ωω×n × k + ωω×nA(ζ).
By the induction principle (IND), applied on k, we obtain
∀ζ ≺ θ + ωω×n × 0A(ζ)⇒ ∀k ∀ζ ≺ θ + ωω×n × k A(ζ)
giving us
∀ζ ≺ θ A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ θ + ωω×n × ω A(ζ)
which is
∀ζ ≺ θ A(ζ)⇒ ∀ζ ≺ θ + ωω×(n+1)A(ζ)

Lemma 7 immediately entails that Rn(Basic) proves TILT(< ω
ω×n). Therefore, if
we reflect on TS0 instead of Basic, we are able to define in R
n(TS0) ramified truth
predicates for any ordinal smaller than ωω×n by following the strategy employed
by Halbach and Horsten and described on page 14.
This strategy can be iterated even further. Ideally, we would like to reach, by as
little reflection iterations as possible, the amount of transfinite induction for LT –
and therefore of ramified truth predicates – that are available in KF, the classical
counterpart of PKF. However, we conclude this section by providing only a first,
and presumably rather inefficient, approximation to this task.
By letting Rω(Basic) :=
⋃
n∈ω R
n(Basic), a direct consequence of Lemma 7 is
that
Corollary 3. In Rω(Basic) we have TILT(< ω
(ω2))
Therefore the theory Rω(TS0) can define ramified truth predicates indexed by
all ordinals ωω×n for all natural numbers n.
Although ω may seem to be a natural stopping point, the procedure can be iter-
ated even further into the transfinite. Following a well-known tradition initiated by
Feferman in [5], the theories Rn(Basic) can all be shown to be recursively enumer-
able. Moreover, the notion of being a proof in Rn(Basic) is recursive. We can then
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find a primitive recursive function enumerating all those proof predicates. By em-
ploying the recursion theorem, therefore, we can find an index for this enumeration
that can be used to formalize, via a recursive predicate, the notion of being a proof
employing rules proper of one of the theories Rn(Basic). This, however, suffices to
formulate the notion of being a proof in Rω(Basic): clearly, similar procedure can
be extended at least to ordinals smaller than ε0.
But once a recursive formalization of transfinite iterations of our reflection rules
is available, it becomes clear that enough iterations of reflection over Basic will lead
us to the amount of transfinite induction for LT available in KF. By letting ω0 := 1,
and ωn+1 := ω
ωn , we have, rather unsurprisingly,
Observation 1. Rωn+1(Basic) ⊢ TILT(ωn)
4. Conclusion
Starting with principles that are minimally constitutive of the notion of truth, such
as the initial sequents of the theory TS0, we have investigated the result of iterating
reflection rules over them. A similar project, in the context of classical logic and
therefore without the basic principles of TS0, has been recently pursued by Horsten
and Leigh [14]. We claim that for two reasons our nonclassical setting provides a
more coherent framework for such a project for two main reasons. First, in a classi-
cal setting the interderivability of A and TpAq (which is the defining characteristic
of TS0) cannot be consistently maintained. Second, following a theme by Kreisel,
the global reflection GRFT for a theory T is the intended soundness extension of T .
Other proof theoretic reflection principles, including the uniform reflection princi-
ple RFNT , are only justified by an appeal to global reflection. However, as shown
in §2.3, in classical axiomatizations of Kripke’s fixed point constructions, the use
of the global reflection principle is at odds with the overall strategy of iterating
reflection rules.
One way to understand the results of this article is by asking which statements
TS0 and the result of iterating reflection rules over it can prove to be true, i.e., by
considering their provable sequents of the form⇒ TpAq for A in LT or, in short, at
their truth theorems. BDM in itself has no theorems at all. When initial sequents
for identity are added to it as well as arithmetical initial sequents, even if the truth
predicate is in the signature of the theory, one only obtains arithmetical theorems
but no truth theorems. TS0, by contrast, does prove truth theorems, but only truth
theorems of the form
T . . .T︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-times
pAq
where A is an arithmetical theorem of Basic. This shortcoming of TS0 is accom-
panied by the lack of other desirable properties of the theory, such as full compo-
sitionality (see again §2.3). By adding a uniform or global reflection rule to TS0,
we restore our full capability of reasoning inductively with the truth predicate,
and several compositional truth sequents. Full compositionality, together with the
possibility of establishing theorems of the form
T . . .T︸ ︷︷ ︸
ωω+n-times
pAq
for A again an arithmetical theorem of Basic, is reached when we consider the
theory R2(TS0), i.e., via a further iteration of the generalized reflection rule RT
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over TS0. At this stage, we already recapture and surpass all truth theorems of
the full compositional theory PKF. A natural goal for the process of iteration
may be to reach the truth theorems of the classical theory KF (or equivalently,
PKF+ TILT(< ε0), as shown in [19]). This can be achieved via suitable transfinite
progressions of theories obtained by reflection over TS0.
From a semantic perspective, there is a tight match between the truth theorems
of our theories and the levels of the construction of the minimal fixed point of
Kripke’s construction from [16]. By extending TS0 with an ω-rule, this connec-
tion can be made explicit: the theorems of TS0 plus the ω-rule are exactly the
LT-sentences that are in the extension of the truth predicate in the minimal fixed
point of Kripke’s theory (see [8] for a recent proof). Uniform reflection principles
are recursive approximations of the ω-rule. Therefore iterations of reflection, and
the corresponding truth theorems of the resulting theories, can be seen as approx-
imations to the full ω-rule added to TS0 as they represent initial stages of the
construction of the minimal fixed point. It is also clear that all the theories that
we have considered are internal axiomatizations of Kripke fixed points. Therefore
the hierarchy that we have studied can also be seen as an attempt to capture,
via recursively axiomatized theories, the set of grounded sentences first isolated by
Kripke.
Nonetheless our work leaves many open questions and possibilities for improve-
ment: from a technical point of view, a sharper proof-theoretic analysis of the
theories obtained by iterated reflection would be desirable to see clearly, for in-
stance, how much one can obtain with finite iterations of reflection. Moreover, it
would be interesting to see whether the reflection rules can be strengthened via
‘higher-order’ reflection rules in such a way that only finitely many iterations of
them could suffice to reach the truth theorems of KF. Finally, there remains the
question whether the gap between TILT(< ω
ω) and TILT(< ε0) – which is deter-
mined by whether PA in the signature of LT is formulated in BDM or classical logic
respectively – can be closed by supplementing BDM with a suitable conditional in
such a way that the conceptual advantages of the treatment of truth in TS0 are
preserved.
References
[1] L. Beklemishev. Reflection principles and provability algebras in formal arithmetic. 2005.
[2] S. Blamey. Partial logic. In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical
Logic, volume 5, pages 261–353. 2 edition, 2002.
[3] A. Cantini. Notes on formal theories of truth. Zeitschrift fu¨r mathematische Logik und Grund-
lagen der Mathematik, 35:97–130, 1989.
[4] S. Feferman. Arithmetization of metamathematics in a general setting. Fundamenta Mathe-
maticae, XLIX:35–92, 1960.
[5] S. Feferman. Transfinite recursive progression of axiomatic theories. The Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 27(3):259–316, 1962.
[6] S. Feferman. Reflecting on incompleteness. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 56:1–47, 1991.
[7] H. Field. Saving Truth from Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2008.
[8] M. Fischer and N. Gratzl. Infinitary proof systems and partial truth. submitted.
[9] P. Ha´jek and P. Pudla´k.Metamathematics of First-Order Arithmetic. Springer Verlag, Berlin,
1993.
[10] V. Halbach. Axiomatic Theories of Truth. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK,
revised edition, 2014.
[11] V. Halbach and L. Horsten. Axiomatizing Kripke’s theory of truth. The Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 71:677–712, 2006.
ITERATED REFLECTION OVER FULL DISQUOTATIONAL TRUTH 19
[12] V. Halbach and C. Nicolai. On the costs of nonclassical logic. To appear in Journal of
Philosophical Logic. Online first https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-017-9424-
3, 2017.
[13] L. Horsten and V. Halbach. Norms for theories of reflexive truth. In K. Fujimoto, J. M.
Ferna´ndez, H. Galinon, and T. Achourioti, editors, Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer
Verlag, 2015.
[14] L. Horsten and G. E. Leigh. Truth is simple. Mind, 126:195–232, 2017.
[15] G. Kreisel and A. Le´vy. Reflection principles and their use for establishing the complexity
of axiomatic systems. Zeitschrift fu¨r mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik,
14:97–142, 1968.
[16] S. Kripke. Outline of a theory of truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 72:690–716, 1975.
[17] H. Leitgeb. What theories of truth should be like (but cannot be). Philosophy Compass,
2(2):276–290, 2007.
[18] S. Negri and J. Von Plato. Cut elimination in the presence of axioms. Bulletin of Symbolic
Logic, 4(4):418–435, 1998.
[19] C. Nicolai. Provably true sentences across axiomatizations of Kripke’s theory of truth. Sub-
mitted.
[20] W. Pohlers. Proof Theory, The first step into impredicativity. Springer Verlag, 2009.
[21] C. Smorynski. The incompleteness theorems. In J. Barwise, editor, Handbook of Mathematical
Logic, pages 821–865. Dordrecht, 1977.
